

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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DRAFTED BY PM/DCA:JSALMON
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:ACFLOYD
C:JKELLY
PM/DCA:CFLOWERREE
EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON
OSD:LMICHAEL
JCS:RMCCANN
NSC:MHIGGINS
ACDA/IR:DAENGEL
S/S -LCJOHNSTONE

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P R 020039Z AUG 75
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TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
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S E C R E T STATE 182853

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: RESPONSE TO BELGIAN VIEWS ON OPTION III

REF: A. NATO 3979 B. NATO 3938 C. NATO 2927

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1. YOU MAY SPEAK TO BELGIAN REP ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. APPRECIATE THOUGHTFUL BELGIAN CONTRIBUTION TO DEBATE
ON DIFFICULT CEILINGS QUESTION. WE HAVE PONDERED AT GREAT

LENGTH ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF ESTABLISHING RESTRAINTS. OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT OPTION III WOULD HAVE LITTLE APPEAL FOR EAST IF WE DID NOT AGREE TO LIMIT THOSE US ELEMENTS WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN THE OPTION III OFFER. A MERE PLEDGE NOT TO REINTRODUCE THE WITHDRAWN EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ASSURANCE THAT SIMILAR EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT LIMITATIONS ON WITHDRAWN SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD BE MORE STRINGENT THAN THOSE ON WITHDRAWN US EQUIPMENT.

B. WE AGREE THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD INITIALLY AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO ANY DEBATE ON POST-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. WE AGREE WITH BELGIAN POSITION THAT LIMITS ON NON-US ALLIED NUCLEAR OR AIR ELEMENTS SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

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C. CLEARLY DEFINING THE EQUIPMENT TO BE LIMITED ALSO OFFERS PROTECTION FOR THE WEST AGAINST PROBABLE EASTERN EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE THE IMPLICIT COMPLEMENT OF WITHDRAWALS. IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR DEFINITION THE EAST MAY USE THIS IMPRECISION AS AN EXCUSE TO ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN WESTERN DEFENSE AFFAIRS IN THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD BY ARGUING, INTER ALIA, THAT ALL WESTERN EQUIPMENT IS CONSTRAINED. WITHOUT CLEAR MUTUALLY AGREED DEFINITIONS THEY CAN ALSO ARGUE QUITE COGENTLY THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ALL SSM LAUNCHERS, NOT JUST THOSE FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 500 KM, ARE LIMITED. NEGOTIATING LIMITATIONS ONLY ON SELECTED EQUIPMENT ITEMS WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ALLIED POSITION THAT ITEMS NOT SPECIFIED FOR LIMITATIONS ARE NOT CONSTRAINED. THIS ALSO ALLOWS US TO CONFINE ANY RESTRAINTS TO APPROPRIATELY DEFINED SUB-CATEGORIES OF THE ELEMENTS REDUCED (E.G., NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS VICE ALL TACTICAL
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AIRCRAFT). HENCE, OUR APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO CONFINE ANY WP DROIT DE REGARD STEMMING FROM AN MBFR AGREEMENT TO SELECTED US ARMAMENTS ALONE.

D. AS FOR WILLOT'S PERSONAL VIEWS, OUR PROBLEM WITH HIS PROPOSAL (A) IN PARA 3 REFTEL B, (CONSTRAINTS ON US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO BE DESCRIBED AS "COMMITMENT NOT TO RETURN ITEMS WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED") IS SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED ABOVE, I.E., THE EAST WILL NEED ASSURANCE THAT WITHDRAWALS WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY INTRODUCTION OF SIMILAR US EQUIPMENT. AS FOR CONSTRAINTS ON US TANKS (WILLOT'S POINT (B)), WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ANY EASTERN REQUEST WERE MADE IN A CONTEXT

WHICH GAVE US ASSURANCE THEY WOULD NOT ASK FOR CONSTRAINTS
ON NON-US TANKS. HOWEVER, IN CONSIDERING THIS TACTICAL
MATTER, WE MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE ABLE TO DISCERN WHAT
SECONDARY OBJECTIVES THE EAST WOULD HAVE WHEN IT ASKED FOR
CONSTRAINTS ON US TANKS. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD MAKE IT
CLEAR IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD WHEN THE ISSUE AROSE,
THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS ON US TANKS DID NOT
APPLY TO ALLIED TANKS. INGERSOLL

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